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Introduction
We model a dynamic competitive economy in which at money competes against real capital as a store of value. The main result of the paper is the existence of general equilibria in which the value of money is bounded away from zero. In every such equilibrium both capital and money are used as stores of value. The driving force behind this result is not one of the frictions usually used in monetary economies, e.g. cash-in-advance or money in the utility function. We rather derive our general equilibrium result in the spirit of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) by giving money a transactions costs advantage over real capital. By way of introduction, we subsequently motivate the study by explaining the relevant doctrinal history before we then sum up the structure of the model.
In his classical contribution, Frank Hahn (1965) considered a standard Walrasian nite horizon economy in which outside money can only be valued to the extend that it is exchanged for something else. He proved the negative result that, under an assumption which involves that the utility of money is zero if money holdings itself is zero, the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium does not imply the existence of a monetary Walrasian equilibrium. There is no mechanism which prevents that the value of money may be driven out. This result has become known as the Hahn problem. 1 One possibility to get rid of the Hahn problem is to model money as a store of value. For instance, in a standard overlapping-generations framework, Grandmont and Laroque (1973) argued that money serves as the store of value to nance consumption after retirement. Bewley (1980, 1983) and Hellwig (1982) model economies where money is held for precautionary reasons as a hedge against stochastic shocks in the value of households endowments. Driven by the convexity of preferences, the same structural result is also true with purely deterministic uctuations in income. 2 In these papers, however, money is assumed to be the only store of value in the economy. The main result of the analysis, namely that money has value because it is held over time, becomes wrong if worthless at money has to compete in a frictionless economy against another asset which dominates money in the return characteristics. Even stronger, if there exists an asset next to money having a higher own rate of return than money but the same marketability properties, then the value of money must be zero in every rational expectations environment (Hahn (1982) , Hellwig (1993) ). This problem is called the modied Hahn problem (Hellwig (1993) ).
To derive a positive value of money in the presence of dominant assets, the latter result implies that money must have advantages in the marketability properties as compared to the other assets. The rst and easiest possibility to achieve this is to model a cash-in-advance constraint. A second possibility, which we will employ in this paper, is to introduce xed transaction costs. The seminal contribution following this idea is Hellwig (1984, 1988) . Their model economy is populated by a continuum of identical and innitely lived households and each household owns and manages its own rm. Money competes as a store of value against capital which can be invested in the rms. Assuming that the payments of dividends between the agent's rm account and the agent's consumption account require xed real costs implies that money survives as a store of value. Indeed, it is held over time to nance consumption between the transaction dates.
To use transaction costs as the driving force for money demand in the presence of dominant assets goes back to Baumol's (1952) and Tobin's (1956) analysis of the transactions demand for money. They basically argued that wealth in the form of the interest bearing asset must rst be transferred at xed transactions costs to the money purse, say, before it can be used to buy consumption goods. Since money can directly be held in the money purse, it has an advantage in its marketability characteristics. However, the analysis of Baumol and Tobin does not provide a positive answer to the modied Hahn problem because it is not an equilibrium analysis. They focus on an isolated optimization problem of an agent minimizing his cost of cash management over time. 3 The coordination of these microeconomic plans in the markets, i.e. whether the analysis is consistent with market clearing, is not analyzed at all. In fact, Baumol and Tobin develop a microeconomic decision problem taking the value of money for granted and assuming a constant an exogenous interest rate. Furthermore, the analysis of individual optimization has deep conceptual problems. The most important critical points are that the analysis is conducted in terms of the time averages of the decision variables instead of the decision variables themselves and that the nonconvexity of the problem is just assumed away. 4 It is clear that a model which proves the validity of Baumol's and Tobin's argument in a general 3 These costs are opportunity costs from holding money since there is an asset with a higher rate of return plus transaction costs which arise from a transfer of asset market wealth to the money purse. 4 A detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Hellwig (1993 Suppose we have a two period overlapping-generations framework in which agents start their life with an endowment of money, invest, say, one half of it in the bond and spend the other half on consumption when they are young. Once retired, they need to sell their bonds for cash to nance consumption when they are old. At the same instant of time when the young generation turns to get old, a new generation with equal characteristics is born which just desires as many bonds as the older generation supplies. This construction allows for a constant interest rate and a steady-state equilibrium.
There is no trade in bonds or money at other instants of time. However, a steady-state analysis where trade is permitted only occasionally to make a model work should not be considered as an exhausting analysis of this topic. Another disadvantage of this literature is that the nonconvexity is mostly neglected or absent by construction. 5 Non-steady-state models are Hellwig (1984, 1988) , Shubik and Yao (1993) or Dréze and Polemarchakis (2000) . Dréze and Polemarchakis (2000) use a nite horizon framework with inside money only. They do not address the equilibrium problem mentioned before because they refer to time averages and a constant and exogenous interest rate within a single BaumolTobin period. Shubik and Yao (1993) model exogenous interest rates and rely on an analysis in terms of time averages. The latter implies that the whole structure "within the period" is left open.
Outline of the Model. The model presented here basically builds on the insights of Hellwig (1984, 1988 ) and extends their model. Time is discrete, the horizon is unbounded and the economy is populated by house-holds and rms. In every period, there is a labor market, a market for capital, a money market and a market for a physical output good. The latter can be consumed or invested. Households accumulate the claims on capital to earn a return from renting it to rms and they supply labor to earn wage income. A transactions demand for money is generated by the assumption that households have two physically separated accounts: a cash account and a checking account. On the latter account they accumulate claims on capital and earn their labor and rental income. On the cash account, households may choose to inventory money and to nance consumption. If households want to transfer wealth between their two accounts, they have to sacrice some xed costs because the two accounts are physically separated. These xed costs eventually prevent the households from transferring wealth every period but rather provides for the incentives to hold money as a store of value on the cash account between two transfer periods.
The transaction patterns of households are endogenous. Equivalently, the number of periods over which households choose to hold money is determined by optimization. It can even be zero for a positive measure of households. The reason is that after nancing a transfer today, no money holdings between yesterday and today is required to nance today's consumption. To put it dierently, we not impose an assumption on the timing of markets. Because goods must be bought with money, but the time period over which money is held is not exogenously xed, one can say that this model has a "exible cash-in-advance constraint". 6 In Section 2.2 we describe the economy, the households and rms. In Section 2.3 we dene the equilibrium, in Section 2.4 we state our assumptions and the result of the paper. In Section 2.5 we summarize some properties of the equilibrium, in Section 2.6 we conclude the paper and in the appendix to this chapter, Section 2.7, we prove the result.
The Model

The Basic Structure
Time is discrete, a period is denoted with t and the set of periods is T := N. The economy is populated by households and rms. The generic household is denoted with h and the set of households, H, is without loss of generality assumed to be the unit interval, H = [0, 1]. There is a single physical output good which is produced by rms using labor and capital as inputs. Households supply labor every period to earn wage income. At each point in time, current output of the economy must be divided into gross investment in the capital stock and consumption. This consumption-saving decision is made by households. In addition, there is at money which can be held as a store of value. The generic rm is denoted with j and the set of rms, J, is without loss of generality assumed to be the unit interval, J = [0, 1]. Firms have identical production functions F which transform labor and capital into the single output good of this economy. In every period, competitive labor, capital, output and money markets meet. The Lebesgue measure is assumed to be the population measure for both households and rms.
Households
The friction which generates a transactions demand of households for money is as follows. Every household h ∈ H has two separated accounts, a cash account, or money purse, and a checking account. The latter can be thought of as being held in an unmodelled bank. Let p t denote the price of the output good in period t in terms of money and c h t denote consumption of h ∈ H in period t ∈ T . h must nance his consumption expenditure in period t, p t c h t , on the cash account. To do so, he can either use cash inventoried voluntarily from the previous period, m h t−1 , or alternatively use a transfer of nominal wealth from the checking account to the cash account, ∆ h t . Importantly, the household is not forced to hold any money over time as in a standard cash-in-advance model. Instead he can use the nominal income he receives in the same period on the checking account for consumption purposes.
In case of a nominal transfer between his two accounts, household h has to sacrice some xed transactions costs. These transactions costs consist of transactions costs in the output good, γ c , and transactions costs in time or labor, γ l . As for the labor costs, the transactions costs mapping is denoted with κ l and dened by
For the output costs, we dene the two mappings κ 1 c and κ 2 c by
If ∆ h t = 0 then the household has to "purchase γ c on the market" at costs p t γ c . We understand the direction of the transfer such that if ∆ h t > 0 then household h transfers wealth in period t from the checking account to the cash account and vice versa for ∆ h t < 0. The two mappings κ 1 c and κ 2 c are used to model the circumstance that the transactions costs are paid on the account from which the transfer is nanced. So if ∆ h t > 0, the household has to nance the expenses for the xed costs, p t κ 2 c ∆ h t = p t γ c , on the checking account and if ∆ h t < 0, he has to nance p t κ 1 c ∆ h t = p t γ c on the cash account. 7 Denote with e the time invariant labor time endowment of every h. Since leisure is no argument of utilities, all the available time is supplied inelastically as labor as long as the wage is positive. Let w t denote the real wage, r t be the real rental rate for capital use between t − 1 and t and k h t ≥ 0 be the claims on capital household h owns between the periods t − 1 and t. On the checking account, h earns his wage income, which is p t w t (e−κ l (∆ h t )) in nominal terms, he invests in the capital stock he wants to own at the end of period t, i h t 0, he receives the nominal return from renting the capital he owned between t − 1 and t to rms, p t k h t r t , and he nally receives nominal dividend payments from rms, p t D h t . The law of motion for capital owned by household h is linear and takes the usual form k h t+1 = i h t + (1 − δ)k h t , where δ is the constant rate of depreciation, 0 < δ < 1. In period one, every household h ∈ H is endowed with outside money m h > 0 on the cash account and with capital k h > 0 on the checking account. Let m h t ≥ 0 be the money held by h at the end of t on the cash account and n h t ≥ 0 be the money held by h at the end of t on the checking account.
Every household has one constraint for each account. The constraints in the rst period on the cash account and on the checking account are, respectively,
and in every period t ≥ 2,
We will assume constant returns to scale which implies that the dividends are zero if the rms maximize. 8 Notice that we have already plugged in the law of motion for capital to simplify the presentation. The interpretation of the capital held in the checking account is as follows: in period t ∈ T , households choose to own some physical output not for consumption but for savings reasons. They rent this physical object to rms who will pay a rental rate for using it in t + 1. This output to be saved is called capital and the quantity of capital owned by h in t is denoted with k h t+1 . Households cannot hold this physical object themselves because they are not endowed with some kind of storage technology. Instead, they supply this capital in t to rms to earn a revenue consisting of two terms in t + 1: rst, the rents rms pay for using capital in production, p t+1 k h t+1 r t+1 , and secondly the revenue from selling on the output market the ownership of what is left from their capital after rms have produced with it, p t+1 k h t+1 (1 − δ). Note that the physical object capital is held in the rm sector because they use it in the production process. They pay the rents for using this input in t + 1, when the production process is nished, but capital supply and demand actually meet already in t.
Denote p := (p t ) t∈T and use the same notation for w, r and D. An action of an agent in some period t is a vector (c h
The space Q h is endowed with the product topology. Let
Note that the dividend which household h ∈ H receives does not carry an index h. The rationale for this simplied notation is as follows: household h ∈ H actually receives a dividend D h t which is the mean value of the dividends h gets from all rms j ∈ J according to his shares θ
However, since households are identical, θ h j = θ j . The fact that shares sum up to one for every rm j,
Since rms are symmetric, we know that
This equality justies the notation.
be the space carrying price vectors of the form (p t , r t , w t ) t∈T and endow it with the product topology. Since the topological spaces Q h and S endowed with the product topology are metrizable, we will treat them throughout as metric spaces.
The budget set of household h is the correspondence B h : S ⇒ Q h dened by 9 
His objective is to maximize this function by choosing a best element σ h * ∈ B h (p, r, w). Note that the budget set is not convex due to the xed transactions costs.
We will frequently argue in terms of real variables instead of nominal ones. For later reference let us therefore state the budget restrictions of an agent h ∈ H in real terms before we continue. Denote the gross rate of deation with π t−1 :=
and let real variables (measured in the consumption good) be denoted with a tilde. Then the budget constraints read as
2. 
+ . An action vector summarizing the rm's action over all periods is denoted with σ j := (y 
Competitive Equilibria
Before we dene a competitive equilibrium, we briey describe the interaction of rms and households in this economy. To understand this interaction, one can imagine a bank in which all households h ∈ H hold their checking account. Figure 1 illustrates the ow of real terms. The ow of the consumption good is from rms to households, the labor ow is in the opposite direction. Households accumulate the claims on capital as assets in the bank. 9 For notational reasons, we suppress the parameters in the notation of the budget set. The claims on capital ow in this period into the rm sector allowing the rms to use the physical capital for production. Claims on capital from the previous period left over after depreciation ow in this sense back to the bank. Figure 2 illustrates the money ow in a period. Every arrow in the gure represents a particular ow of money. Firms pay wages and rents for capital in money on the checking accounts of households, i.e to the bank. Every household pays money for consumption reasons from the cash account to rms. Some households may choose to transfer some nominal wealth between his two accounts in this period. However, this need not be true for every household since they are free to hold money over time to save the transactions costs. 10 This is why the set of households is disassembled in two subsets, one subset of households with transfers in this period and one without.
Dene total transactions costs in the output good by κ c (·) := κ 1 c (·)+κ 2 c (·). Consumption, labor, capital and money markets clear, if,
10 One might wonder how this statement relates to the fact that households are identical. The nonconvexity of the budget sets, however, implies that there will typically be several best actions for the household in his budget set. This implies that households of the same type will be taking dierent actions among which they are indierent. 
Denition 1 A Competitive Equilibrium for this economy is a tuple
A Competitive Equilibrium is said to be monetary if the price of at money is positive in every period.
Existence of Equilibrium
In this Section, we formulate and explain the assumptions we impose to get existence of a monetary equilibrium. Denote with F a the partial derivative of F with respect to argument a.
Assumption 1 (i) F is continuous and strictly increasing on R 2 + , continuously dierentiable on R 2 ++ , has constant returns to scale and satises
Part (i) of this Assumption is a standard regularity assumption. Part (ii) imposes the standard Inada conditions for labor input. In addition, we explicitly require that the marginal product of labor diverges as capital input diverges. In economic terms, if the capital stock becomes innite, then the wage becomes innite, too. Part (iii) in the rst place says that the Inada condition at zero capital input is true. However, we violate the typical assumption that the marginal product of capital converges to zero as capital runs out of bounds. Indeed, we assume that the marginal product of capital is bounded below by the rate of depreciation. The reason for this is as follows: In equilibrium, the rental rate equals the marginal product of capital. Hence, the marginal productivity of capital in this model is always large enough to make r + 1 − δ not smaller than one. In an equilibrium, households can then accumulate their labor income as real wealth on the checking account over time to aord a transfer in some nite future period. If the interest rate would be arbitrary close to zero, then the household could perhaps never be able to transfer some wealth from the checking account to the cash account. 11 Finally, lim
This property is required to argue that the aggregate capital stock remains nite in equilibrium.
Assumption 2 Households are identical with respect to their utility functions and endowments. Utilities are given by the function
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and u(c h t ) = ln c h t .
The assumption that the one-period utility function is logarithmic is imposed to simplify some arguments in the proof of the theorem.
Assumption 3 m h > 0 and k
Assumption 4 Dene the valuek by the equation β F
While Assumption 3 does not require comments, Assumption 4 is crucial and needs to be discussed: at the level of capital which would be the steady-state level in the frictionless economy using labor net of transactions costs,k, the net output is strictly less than the transactions costs in output. This assumption is sucient to avoid the constellation that every household wants to transfer wealth in every period. This could be consistent with an equilibrium in which money has no value at all. Taking Assumptions (1) and (4) together, they imply that for every k < k we have γ c > F (e − γ l , k) − kδ, and for every k > k we have γ c < F (e − γ l , k) − kδ. Note that the assumption bounds the transactions costs in the output good below and above.
The next assumption is very unproblematic in that it just says that the transactions costs in labor must not exceed the endowment of labor:
Assumption 5 e > γ l > 0.
It becomes clear that the assumptions we need in order to show the existence of an equilibrium in this Baumol-Tobin economy cannot be considered as innocent, in particular Assumptions 1 and 4. Perhaps one can interpret this fact by saying that the textbook theory of Baumol-Tobin is far too oversimplied and hence in this sense not very convincing. On the other hand, note that the set of assumptions is, as always, only sucient, they might be quite far from being necessary. For some readers, this might be a counterargument to the accusation that the assumptions are strong.
Theorem Under Assumptions 1 -5, there exists a Monetary Competitive
Equilibrium.
The theorem is proven in the appendix. In the next section we remark on some properties of an equilibrium and interpret the structure of the model.
Remarks
Remark 1 In the following list, we summarize some properties of the equilibrium we show to exist. The proofs of these properties are included in the proof of the Theorem.
(i) There is a R < +∞ and a c > 0 such that c < π t−1 ≤ r t + 1 − δ < R for every t ∈ T . That is, gross deation is uniformly bounded away from zero, the interest rate is uniformly bounded away from innity 13 and money is (weakly) dominated as a store of value on the checking account. 12 (ii) For (almost) every h ∈ H, there is a rst t < +∞ such that ∆ h t > 0, and for every s ∈ T with ∆ h s > 0 there is a nite integer τ > 0 such that ∆ h s+τ > 0. That is, (almost) every household make a rst transfer after nitely many periods and there is no last transfer.
(iii) There are h ∈ H with positive measure having ∆ h t = 0 for innitely many t ∈ T .
(iv) The equilibrium capital stock remains nite.
Remark 2 We call this economy a Baumol-Tobin economy for the following reasons: First, money held on the cash account can be used for consumption at zero costs, where wealth from capital accumulation must be transferred at xed costs to the cash account to nance consumption. This structure allows money to survive as a store of value since it has advantages in terms of marketability. Second, households actions show a transactions pattern which is similar to the original sawtooth pattern since households visit "the bank" from time to time but not everybody does so in every period (Parts (ii) and (iii) of Remark 1). Third, Assumption 4 implicitly denes a lower bound on the transactions costs. It is precisely this lower bound which eventually makes sure that money has a positive value in equilibrium. We will implicitly show that Assumption 4 is sucient not to allow everybody to transfer wealth in every period. Importantly, this means that households hold money as a store of value on the cash account between two transaction dates. The only purpose for doing so is the transactions motive.
Remark 3 Romer (1986) called his model with a similar structure a monetary model with a "exible Clower constraint" (Romer (1986) , p. 666). He emphasizes that goods must be bought with money, but that the time period over which money is held is not exogenously xed. In contrast, in a typical cash-in-advance economy the number of periods over which an agent holds money is by construction always one. Households receive their income in the evening of a day and need to hold it over night to use it either on the asset or on the commodity markets at the next day. The model presented in this paper can be interpreted similarly as the one in Romer (1986) . The demand for money as a store of value is not derived by an exogenously imposed structure like the timing of markets. Instead, households money demand is determined endogenously by portfolio choice. Thus, households also choose the number of periods over which to hold the money endogenously. But note that they are not forced to hold the money over time at all.
Remark 4 The introduction of xed costs which have to be paid if a transfer occurs implies that the households optimization problem is not convex. This complicates the analysis of such an economy drastically. Clearly, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are not sucient implying that the simplest existence argument in a macroeconomic model obviously fails. To get existence, we aggregate over a continuum of households to get the convexication of aggregate demand. Notice that it is the non-convex character of the transfer costs which makes households want to hold money over time to exploit the economies of scale which are inherent in this transactions technology.
Concluding Remarks
We conclude the paper by showing some directions of future research. In the rst place, the analysis should be extended to allow for wage payments on the cash account. This can be done using a paycheck parameter which gives the fractions of the wages paid on both accounts. If all the wages are paid on the cash account, then the monetary aggregate which is modelled can be said to be broader. Indeed, it allows for the interpretation that the aggregate M1 can be held on the cash account, not only cash. As a consequence, the possibility to hold money also on the checking account is then not as meaningful as in the framework chosen here since this account should then be interpreted as an account for the interest bearing assets only. Second, the analysis can be extended to include a nominal bond as a second interest bearing asset in the economy. Households can incur some debt position over time since they can sell the bond short. This possibility should allow to get rid of the articial restriction that the transactions costs must be paid on the account from which a transfer is nanced, as formalized by the two separate mappings κ 1 and κ 2 . As a third extension one can imagine a more general setting with several goods. Leaving the framework of the neoclassical model with one physical object complicates the analysis drastically since it is not clear how to formulate Assumption 4 in a more general economy. Finally, the analysis should be extended to allow for staggered wage payments. That is, one can assume that the wages are paid not every period but only from time to time. In the rst place it can be analyzed how the interest rate process reacts to such a payment structure. If rms have to incur some debt to pay wages in advance for a whole month, say, then they will have to compete for the funds from the household sector at this date. One can suspect that the interest rates will tend to be higher at such points in time. As a consequence, optimal behavior should then imply that rms voluntarily choose heterogeneous wage payment dates over the month. Hence, the date of wage payments should then be included into the analysis (see Hellwig 1993 ).
Appendix
In this appendix we prove the theorem. The demand correspondence of household h ∈ H is the mapping φ h : S ⇒ Q h dened by
The extended demand correspondenceφ h is the mappingφ h :
w) . (9)
Let us introduce the numbers v, u ∈ N, and restrict prices p to be in the set
, rental rates r to be in the set R vu := r ∈ R ∞ + |∀t ∈ T : r t ∈ δ + 1/(vu) 2 , δ + (vu) 2 , and wages to be in the set
The compact product space is denoted with
We treat all product spaces as metric spaces.
Step (p, r, w) . For all t ∈ T , σ a → σ implies σ a t → σ t . From the hypothesis σ / ∈ B h (p, r, w) it follows that there is a t ∈ T such that at least one of the budget constraints is violated at σ t . This strict inequality of one of the budget constraints implies that the violation of the budget must be true for all a large enough. We now argue that this violation of the budget cannot be due to a jump in the xed costs term. By denition of σ t , ∆ a t → ∆ t since σ a t → σ t . If ∆ t = 0, then ∆ a t = 0 for all a large enough so that the xed costs cannot jump in the limit. If ∆ t = 0 but ∆ a t = 0 for all but nitely many a, then this jump will make the expenditure terms in the budget constraints jump downwards in the limit, but never upwards. Hence the hypothesis cannot be due to the xed costs terms. It now follows from standard arguments that σ / ∈ B h (p, r, w) cannot be true if σ a → σ with σ a ∈ B h (p, r, w) for all a.
(iii) To see upper hemi-continuity of the budget set, let (p a , r a , w a ) → (p, r, w), σ a ∈ B h (p a , r a , w a ) for all a and σ a → σ. σ ∈ B h (p, r, w) follows from the same argument as given in part (ii). Concerning lower hemicontinuity, let (p a , r a , w a ) → (p, r, w) and σ ∈ B h (p, r, w). We have to argue that there is a sequence σ a → σ with σ a ∈ B h (p a , r a , w a ) for all a large enough. We make the argument conditional on the vector ∆ which is one dimension of the limit action σ. Take an arbitrary t ∈ T . We will argue that there is a sequence of actions in t converging to the limit action such that the budget constraints in t are satised. Doing so, we take the action from period t − 1 as given. Since this argument is applied for every t ∈ T , we get the desired result.
Suppose rst that ∆ t < 0. Then we have in the limit 14 That is all we have to show in this case.
Suppose now that ∆ t > 0: We get for the checking account in the limit that 0 < This nishes the proof for lower hemi-continuity and hence for continuity.
Step 2 14 Here we need that output transactions costs are dened by the separate mappings κ 1 and κ 2 . If the household would be forced to pay the transactions costs also in the case ∆t < 0 from the checking account, then the argument given in the text fails: instead of the number y dened in the text, we would have y − γ c . Nothing prevents us from supposing that this term is zero in the limit. Along the sequence, using the ∆ a t which makes the cash account valid, the checking account could perhaps never be satised in certain circumstances. For suppose that y a −γ c converges from below to zero, just because the prices sequence makes this happen. Since capital and money demand are nonnegative, there cannot exist such a sequence we are looking for.
Step 3 (ii)φ h is compact-valued on S vu since the budget set is compact-valued on S vu . To see that the extended demand correspondenceφ h is also upper hemi-continuous, take a sequence  (p a , w a , r a ) → (p, w, r) . In addition, letσ a ∈φ h (p a , w a , r a ) andσ a →σ. We have to argue thatσ h ∈φ h (p, w, r) . By the previous step and the denition of the extended demand, there is a sequence σ a ∈ φ h (p a , w a , r a ) with the property σ a → σ ∈ φ h (p, w, r). Thus, it remains to show that the sequence of xed costs generated from this action sequence converges, i.
. Suppose this is not true. Then κ(·) jumps in the limit, but not before, i.e. κ(σ a ) = γ for innitely many a, but κ(σ) = 0 (if σ a would be such that the limit ∆ was non-zero, then it would be non-zero for every large enough a and κ(σ) would eventually converge). This contradicts optimality: since  (p a , w a , r a ) → (p, w, r) and σ a → σ h , the budget equations converges with a. By optimality, they must hold with equality along the sequence. But our hypothesis implies that we have a strict inequality in the limit.
Denote with S t,vu the projection of S vu onto t and let σ j t (p t , w t , r t ) := (y j (p t , w t , r t ), k j (p t , w t , r t ), l j (p t , w t , r t )) be rm j s supply and demand on the output, capital and labor markets, respectively, which solve the maximization problem at prices (p t , w t , r t ) ∈ S t,vu . 15 The aggregate, which is by symmetry identical, is denoted by
Using Assumption 1, standard arguments immediately imply the following result:
Step 4 For every nite v, u, σ J : S vu → R 3 + ∞ is bounded and continuous.
For presentational reasons, let Q M := R 3 ∞ be the space carrying the actions on the consumption, labor and capital markets in every period, respectively. Household s demand on these markets is a mapping
Let K vu ⊂ Q M be a compact and convex cube containing the set Ξ(S vu ). The existence of such a set follows for all nite v and u from what we established before. K t,vu denotes the projection of K vu onto the t-th component, i.e. K t,vu = K ct,vu ×K lt,vu ×K kt,vu , where the latter sets are one-dimensional sets carrying the excess demands on consumption, labor and capital markets in t, respectively. By Tychono s Theorem, every coordinate set is a compact subset of R. Dene for every t ∈ T the mapping ζ ct,vu :
and the mapping ζ kt,vu :
and nally the product mapping ζ vu : K vu ⇒ S vu by
Let co Ξ h denote the closure of the convex hull of Ξ h and dene the correspondence
Step 5 For every (v, u) , there is a xed point
Proof. We will show that the map We deal with a sequence of xed points indexed by v and u. We rst hold u xed and let v → +∞. We can choose subsequences, denoted as the original sequence, which have a unique limit point as v → +∞. We denote such a limit by
Note that it is not clear a priori whether the limit of the subsequence is nite or not. From now on, we replace the original sequence with such a subsequence. In the next step, we show that the aggregate capital stock is bounded away from zero along every such subsequence.
Step 6 Dene k * t,vu to be aggregate capital supply in t in the xed point with number vu. There exists a b > 0 such that for every t and u, lim
Proof. Suppose the claim is wrong. Then, for every b > 0, there is a
Choose a sequence {b n } n with b n > 0 for all n such that lim n→+∞ b n = 0. There are corresponding sequences {t(b n )} n and {u(b n )} n which we denote with {t n } n := {t(b n )} n and {u n } n := {u(b n )} n for better readability. Taking subsequences, if necessary, we may assume that {b n } n , {t n } n and {u n } n converge. > 0 and t ha vu → ∞ as a → ∞. This simply follows from the positive wage rate for v nite and the fact that the real return on capital, r * t,vu + 1 − δ, is always at least one. Hence households can accumulate real wealth on the checking account to aord a transfer after nitely many periods. This implies that the constraints on the checking account bind.
Taking subsequences, if necessary, we may assume that for every xed n and u and for all large enough v either π
In the rest of the proof, we will distinguish three scenarios according to these possibilities. We will mostly argue with xed n and hence implicitly assume that n is large enough to make the respective argument work. 
In every xed point, this is only consistent with
there is a subsequence such that
Hence, for every n, it holds that for every > 0, there is av such that for
It is now easy to see that, for n suciently large, a suciently large k d * t n ,vu n r * t n ,vu n would eventually contradict prot maximization, which is, however, an ingredient of every xed point.
(ii.1) Suppose that lim n→∞ lim v→∞ k * t n ,vu n r * t n ,vu n = 0. Hence, for every > 0, there exists a N (= N ( )) such that for all n ≥ N , the following is true: for every η > 0, there is a V (= V (n, η) ) such that for all v ≥ V , k * t n ,vu n r * t n ,vu n < ε + η. The latter property must hence also be true for almost every h ∈ H.
Choose and η small enough. By a now familiar argument, we can assume that n is large enough, in particular n ≥ N . Note that for all v ≥ v 1 it holds that for every h ∈ H,ñ h *
(where b n can be chosen arbitrary small for large enough n) and takes the from the positive∆ h * t n −1,vu n , h earns (r * t n ,vu n + 1 − δ) in t n , which eventually exceeds the transactions costs in t n . Hence for large enough v, the household can increase his consumption in t n large enough to compensate for a small consumption loss in t n − 1 due to the change in transfers∆ h * t n −1,vu n and savings. He must be better o after this deviation, implying that this case is not compatible with best responses.
(ii.1.b) Suppose that there is a v 3 such that for all v > max{v 1 , v 2 , V, v 3 }, ∆ h * t n −1,vu n = 0 for almost every h ∈ H. We know thatñ h * t n −1,vu n = 0 and that the budget constraint on the checking account binds. From this we get
We have to distinguish another three subcases here:
(1) First suppose that there is a v 4 such that for every v > max{v 1 , v 2 , V, v 3 , v 4 }, ∆ h * t n −2,vu n = 0 for almost every household. Then, for every
holds h-almost surely. 
Since income on the checking account is becoming arbitrary large, an argument given in Gale and Hellwig (1984) 16 directly implies that mean consumption in t n −1 is becoming large for large n ≥ N and v ≥ V . But in t n − 1, total supply converges to zero, as seen before. Hence p * t n −1,vu n = u n which implies π * t n −2,vu n ≤ 1, a contradiction. 
We only sketch the argument at this point: If on the one hand, for some large enough n and for all large enough v, r * t n −1,vu n + 1 − δ > π * t n −2,vu n , then money demand on the checking account is zero. But then capital supply in t n −1 cannot become small, as argued in (ii.1.a), a contradiction. If on the other hand, the interest rate is equal to the deation rate for some large enough n and all large enough v, thenñ h * t n −2,vu π * t n −2,vu must diverge. As argued above, consumption in t n − 1 will then be growing, while supply converges to zero, inducing p * t n −1,vu n = u n which implies π * t n −2,vu n ≤ 1, a contradiction.
(ii.1.c) Suppose nally that there is a v 3 such that for all v > max{v 1 , v 2 , V, v 3 }, there is a H ⊂ H with positive measure such that for all h ∈ H ,∆ h * t n −1,vu n < 0. It is easy to see that the same arguments as above imply a contradiction.
Hence the only consistent case is subcase (1b) of subcase (ii.1.b). Repeating the argument eventually implies that, for almost every household, it holds that the successive limit of k h * 1,vu n is zero, of r * 1,vu n it is innite, but of the term k h * 1,vu n r * 1,vu n it is zero. However, every household is endowed with k h 1 > 0 units of capital. It is not hard to see that supplying k h * 1,vu n = k h 1 is the best response for a household given this constellation since the intertemporal utility approaches the supremum with this strategy. 17 This is a contradiction. 17 Again, the precise argument can be found in Footnote 9 in Gale and Hellwig (1984 → +∞, it follows from Assumption 1 that there is at such that for all t ≥t, β(r * t,u + 1 − δ) < 1. Choose some τ ≥t large enough to make sure that k * τ +1,u and k ι * τ +1,u + n ι * τ,u +m ι * τ,u are already large and such that agent ι chooses ∆ ι * τ,u = 0. We know that there is a nite T such that ∆ ι * τ +T,u = 0 again.
We can dene a Kuhn-Tucker function for the maximization problem of every h ∈ H. The resulting Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary but not sucient due to the lack of convexity. Since the transversality condition is derived from the necessary Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it is also necessary. We will argue that household ι eventually violates his transversality condition if k * t,u → +∞. Proof. We rst show that λ for all j ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. On the checking account, optimality implies that ι must accumulate his wage income between τ +1 and τ +T . Hence, the investment k ι * τ +1+j,u +ñ ι * τ +j,u in a "composite asset" having return max{π * t−1,u , r * t,u + 1 − δ} = r * t,u + 1 − δ must be strictly positive in these periods implying 
